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Abstract 
A survey-embedded experiment implemented around the time of the 2014 annual Conference of the Parties 
(COP) (N≈1200) examined whether such summits are able to increase citizens’ awareness of climate 
problems. This study finds that exposure to positive or negative cues about the COP increases climate 
change awareness, particularly among participants who start out with a low level of awareness. Neither 
positive nor negative cues about the COP significantly affect people's policy preferences. Our finding 
resonates with Bernard Cohen’s observation that the mass media may not often be successful in telling 
people what to think, but they are successful in telling readers what to think about. 
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Introduction 
Climate change is a highly complex and long-term phenomenon that, in contrast to short-term environmental 
phenomena, most notably the weather, is hard for ‘ordinary’ citizens to grasp. Nonetheless, scientists and 
governments have made tremendous efforts to communicate the essentials of the challenge to citizens. One 
key reason is that, unlike other policy issues, such as trade or security, climate change mitigation requires 
behavioural change by virtually the entire population, as it necessitates a transition towards a carbon-neutral 
energy regime. This implies that public opinion sets important constraints on what policymakers can achieve 
in their attempts to reduce global warming. 
 Much public debate on climate change takes place via mass media such as TV, radio, and the press, 
where policymakers and stakeholders present information and express their policy preferences and demands. 
Existing studies of media reporting on climate change show that most of the time such debate is low-
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intensity, but that it regularly peaks quite spectacularly around the time of the climate Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs), which have taken place in early December each year since 1995. For instance, in the United 
States (US), we see more newspaper coverage of climate change between November and December 
(McAllister et al. 2016). Climate COPs are not primarily held to affect public opinion in the participating 
countries. However, given the very high mass media attention and the need to obtain public support for 
climate mitigation measures, it is worthwhile to ask whether this ‘informational shock’ has any impact on 
people’s awareness of climate change, and on whether people prefer or oppose greenhouse gas mitigation 
measures. 
 Most of the arguments and the related empirical evidence, in the existing literature, on individual 
attitudes towards climate change and climate policy pertain to personal characteristics of respondents (e.g., 
gender, age, income) and structural characteristics (e.g., country characteristics) (e.g., Leiserowitz 2006; 
Brulle et al. 2012). Other studies have examined whether exogenous shocks in the form of extreme weather 
conditions or economic downturns have an effect on people’s climate change attitudes (Joireman et al. 
2010). They find that extreme weather conditions tend to have a short-term positive effect on individuals’ 
attitudes towards climate change (i.e., they increased perceived climate change risks), whereas the evidence 
with regard to the effects of economic downturns is ambiguous (Kahn and Kochen 2011; Scruggs and 
Benegal 2012; Kachi et al. 2015).  
 We do not know of any study that has examined the effect of climate COPs, and the strong attention 
they receive in the mass media, on public awareness and preferences concerning climate policy. Such an 
analysis faces two important hurdles that we seek to address here. First, existing surveys on climate change 
attitudes and the data they have generated do not allow for a pre- / post-COP comparison, neither at the 
aggregate level (comparison of overall distributions of attitudes before and after the COP) nor at the within-
subject level (focusing on whether individuals change their views) (Leiserowitz 2005, 2006). Second, even 
if we had panel survey data for pre- and post-COP attitudes, drawing causal inferences about the effect of 
COPs would be next to impossible. For instance, it is likely that individuals who differ in education levels 
and interest in and knowledge of environmental and climate issues also differ with respect to (self-selected) 
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media exposure during COPs. This, in turn, is likely to influence how media reporting on climate COPs 
affects them. 
 We address these two hurdles by means of a survey experiment implemented in the US and referring 
to the COP 2014 that took place in Lima. In contrast to the standard setup used by most survey experiments, 
where treatments are administered and responses measured (and compared with those of a control group) at 
one particular point in time, we used a panel approach for the study reported here. Before the COP (that is, 
before media reporting on the COP became ubiquitous) we asked participants to complete a survey on 
climate change awareness and policy preferences. Once the COP was under way, we randomly assigned two 
brief texts with positive or negative cues about the COP to some participants of the first survey, and no cues 
to others (control group). After the COP finished, we again asked all participants to complete a survey on 
climate change awareness and policy preferences. This experimental approach implies that participants with 
differing predispositions with respect to self-selected media exposure and interest in climate change issues 
are randomly (and in effect, evenly) distributed across the two treatment groups and the control group. This 
approach thus allows for causal inferences concerning the effect of media reporting on the COP. The main 
finding is that media coverage of the COP appears to heighten awareness among bystander publics. 
Nonetheless, it does not affect participants’ opinion about climate change mitigation.  
 
Effects of COP-related Media Reporting on Awareness and Policy Preferences 
The amount of information on climate change issues available to the public has increased dramatically over 
recent decades. Such information is now easily accessible to citizens who watch television, listen to the 
radio, read newspapers, or surf the web (e.g., Kellstedt et al. 2008; Anderson 2009; Kahan et al. 2012).  The 
broader question arising is whether and how mass media coverage of climate change issues affects public 
opinion. We are interested in whether and how the strong intensification of media reporting on climate 
change issues (triggered by COPs at regular intervals) influences public opinion on climate change issues. 
Existing research suggests that mass media played an important role in creating public awareness of 
environmental issues in the past (Slovic 2000). Staats et al. (1996), for instance, found that mass media 
coverage of climate change issues increased knowledge of the greenhouse gas effect (Druckman 2005; 
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Dolan et al. 2012). Many other studies conclude, however, that mass media have only a modest influence 
on citizens’ views and attitudes concerning politics and particular policies (Bonfadelli 2002; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2011; Elenbaas et al. 2013). Whether and how mass media influence citizens’ awareness and 
preferences concerning climate change and climate change policy is thus far from obvious.  
 Many surveys measure citizens’ awareness and attitudes or preferences concerning climate change 
and climate change mitigation policy (Stamm et al. 2000; Leiserowitz 2006; Aoyagi-Usui 2008; Sampei and 
Usui 2009; Dolan et al. 2012). They show that people do express attitudes and preferences when prompted 
to do so in surveys; in most surveys only rather few respondents select the ‘don’t know’ category when 
asked to respond to questions about climate change awareness and policy preferences (Blake 2001; Kollmus 
and Agyeman 2002). Generally, survey-based studies find that awareness and policy preferences are shaped 
by socio-demographic factors and pre-existing world-views (e.g., age, gender, income, education, political 
ideology) as well as structural characteristics of the country in which the respondent lives. Weber (2010) 
explains that people are influenced by their own experience. Experience, however, is a weak determinant, 
given that climate change-related hazards (i.e. floods, droughts) might be rare in some areas, and that people 
perceive climatic changes differently (depending on whether and to what degree they are affected) (Keller et 
al. 2006; Weber 2010). Compared to some other policy issues (e.g., economic, or foreign policies), climate 
change appears to be an issue of (relatively) low salience, and many people are thus probably rationally 
(quite) ignorant about it or hold only weak opinions about the issue (Upham et al. 2009; Whitmarsh 2011).  
 Low saliency and limited knowledge imply that certain events, and cues are likely to have an effect 
on people’s awareness of and attitudes concerning climate change (Gerber et al. 2011; Seth et al. 2013). 
Some studies show, for instance, that extreme weather events affect climate risk perceptions (e.g., Nisbet 
and Myers 2007), others that economic downturns do not uniformly have the widely expected negative 
effect on support for climate mitigation policies (e.g., Scruggs and Benegal 2012; Kachi et al. 2015). 
Moreover, various survey experiments suggest that certain types of cues or frames have an effect on 
people’s awareness and attitudes about climate change (Barabas and Jerit 2009; Jerit et al. 2013).  
 These findings leave us with some ambiguity about how well developed people’s attitudes towards 
climate change and climate change mitigation policy really are, and to what extent certain types of events 
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and cues or frames matter. We think that the effects of events and cues or frames should be studied 
together. Political stakeholders and the mass media, through which stakeholders communicate with citizens, 
can (and often do) add cues or frames to such events in order to shape their impact on citizens. For instance, 
stakeholders and mass media may frame a hurricane or drought to demonstrate the urgency of adopting 
climate change mitigation policies. But hurricanes or droughts may also be framed as natural events that 
simply happen due to bad luck, and may happen again regardless of humanity’s reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
 We address this issue from the perspective of climate summits at which governments and non-
governmental actors from around the world gather for a very large-scale and highly visible international 
event: the COPs. These events tend to create a dramatic spike in mass media reporting on climate change 
issues and global climate change negotiations (McAllister et al. 2016). This reporting includes many cues, 
about the respective COP itself, and about climate change policy in general.  
 Iyengar and Kinder (2010) argue that the mass media have a political agenda setting effect, which 
also shapes the attention citizens pay to certain issues. In addition, issues that make it onto the public agenda 
can be framed in a variety of ways, and these frames can affect public opinion. Framing is the process of 
communicating some aspects of a perceived reality, which promotes a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2001). 
Framing can cause ‘framing effects’, which may include ‘issue’ framing effects and ‘equivalence’ framing 
effects. Issue framing effects refer to the particular emphasis of a subset of potentially relevant 
considerations that lead individuals to focus on these considerations while they are forming an opinion about 
an issue (Druckman 2001). Equivalence framing effects refer to the use of logically equivalent, but distinct 
words or phrases that create different preferences. In our experiment, we focus on both issue and 
equivalence framing effects. We suggest that both issue and equivalent framing effects are likely to matter 
for climate change awareness, and that neither of these is likely to matter for climate change policy 
preferences to a significant degree. 
 The issue framing effect on awareness is straightforward and derives from a large body of research 
on the relationship between the mass media and politics (Ansolabehere et al. 1993; Druckman 2001; De 
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Vreese 2004; Iyengar and Kinder 2010). It holds that COPs have an awareness increasing effect because 
they trigger a large amount of mass media reporting, irrespective of whether the reporting is positively or 
negatively slanted with respect to the COP. 
Hypothesis 1a: Exposure to media reporting about the COP increases awareness of the issue of climate 
change. 
 Whether positive or negative reporting on the COP is likely to have a larger effect on awareness is 
less obvious. We look at equivalence framing effects by distinguishing between media reporting that refers 
to the 2014 COP either positively or negatively. A positive piece of information on the COP is one with the 
potential to create favourable perceptions regarding the effectiveness of COPs. For instance, in September 
2014, Fox News reported a statement by Peru’s Environment Minister Manuel Pulgar-Vidal: ‘Anything that 
we can reach after this Summit is a step towards success’. Conversely, negative information intends to 
generate pessimistic feelings regarding the issue at stake and the COP (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2001). Most 
authors agree that negative bias tends to make people more skeptical (Wason 1959; Siegrist and Cvetkovich 
2001). Such information was reported in the Guardian by Peru's foreign minister: ‘the Lima meeting in 
December must produce a first draft of a deal to cut carbon emissions, which will be the first of its kind after 
efforts to get legally binding agreement for cuts from most of the world's countries failed at a blockbuster 
meeting in Copenhagen in 2009’ (Vaughan and Vidal 2014). 
 Negative frames tend to have a stronger awareness increasing effect than positive frames 
(Broandbent 1971; Eysenck 1976; Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Schwartz 1990). It appears that a piece of 
negative information catches individuals’ attention more than a piece of positive information. It triggers 
potential interest in the topic and leads people to look deeper into the issue. If an individual already has 
some experience or interest in climate change issues, a piece of negative information tends to enhance this 
interest. In addition, negative information motivates people to focus their interest specifically on features 
that elicited the negative state (Eysenck 1976; Schwartz 1990). For instance, Taylor (1991) notes that 
negative events evoke stronger and more rapid physiological, cognitive, and emotional responses, i.e., 
opinion shifts.  
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 In our case, this means that when people receive negative information about the COP they could 
become more alarmed and consequently increase their awareness of climate change. Negative aspects of an 
object, event, choice or information are weighted more heavily than positive or neutral aspects. In tasks that 
involve forming impressions, negative information tends to be given more weight than positive information. 
This occurs because negative information is often unexpected, and unexpectedness provides an alternative 
version for the impact of negative information on perspectives (Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Peeters and 
Czapinski 1990). Positive information about the COP is potentially expected and, thus, no further interest is 
triggered. 
Hypothesis 1b: Negative media reporting about the COP increases awareness of the climate change issue 
more than positive reporting.  
 In examining effects on policy preferences, a common assumption is that when people are exposed 
to the particulars of the global warming debate (the COP in our analysis), then one should expect to see 
individual responsibility for mitigation of global warming (Kellstedt et al. 2008). When it comes to 
information provided by the mass media, however, existing research has shown that nearly every policy 
problem (e.g., human rights violations, unemployment)—not only global warming—is presented by the 
media as a debate. This appears to contribute to lower perceived salience amongst citizens (Jamieson and 
Waldman 2003; Kellstedt et al. 2008). That is, the existing literature suggests that mass media reporting 
does not affect people’s perceived responsibility and efficacy with respect to measures against global 
warming (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). The main reason is that although reporting on the COP via the mass 
media prompts reflection on and awareness of the climate change issue, this reporting is evaluated mostly on 
the basis of pre-existing world-views, including for instance, political ideology. Previous research has 
shown that such world-views serve as cognitive short cuts and help people make sense of an otherwise 
highly complex issue (Jamieson and Waldman 2003; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Kellstedt et al. 2008). This 
means that mass media reports do not affect people’s policy preferences. In other words, it is more difficult 
and complex to change people’s perceptions on climate policy through the news. Thus, we expect to find 
empirical support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
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Hypothesis 2a: General exposure to media reporting on the COP does not have a significant effect on 
participants’ preferences concerning climate change mitigation (policy preferences). 
Hypothesis 2b: Neither positive nor negative media reporting on the COP has a significant effect on 
participants’ preferences concerning climate change mitigation (policy preferences). 
Study Design 
Experimental Setup and Sample 
We rely on a panel design that involves within- and between-subject comparisons. Figure 1 illustrates the 
design of the survey-embedded experiment, presenting the different participant groups along with the 
different waves of surveys. We first measure climate change awareness and policy preferences (main 
dependent variables). We randomly assign information treatments concerning the climate COP to 
subsamples, with the control group receiving no treatment. We then measure climate change awareness and 
policy preferences again. This measurement – treatment – measurement process took place within around 20 
days. This design differs from the standard design of survey experiments in which one single survey is 
administered to all participants, and information treatments within that survey are randomly assigned to 
participants. We think that our panel design provides enhanced realism, as it allows us to examine whether 
climate change awareness and policy preferences change over time as a result of repeated information 
treatments. 
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Figure 1: Survey design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 							
 
 We are interested in average treatment effects, and not in a representative picture of public opinion in 
a given country. That is, we are not interested in what citizens of a specific country think about climate 
change. We are only interested in whether exposure to information about climate summits affects people’s 
climate change awareness and policy preferences. In view of this research interest, a convenience sampling 
strategy, which is more cost efficient than national proportional random sampling, is appropriate. 
Participants in our study were recruited on the crowd-sourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
(Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2014) and the experiments were implemented in Qualtrics (Qualtrics 2014).  
Survey before the COP 		
Group 1 
Positive news 
about the COP 
Group 2 
Negative news 
about the COP 
Group 3 
No news received 
Group 1 
Positive news 
about the COP	 Group 2 Negative news about the COP Group 3 No news received 
Survey after the COP 
 
All the participants 	
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 An increasing number of survey experiments in academic research have used AMT to recruit 
participants (Horton et al., 2011; Berinsky et al. 2012; Mason and Suri 2012). Previous studies have shown 
that sample demographics for US-based respondents recruited via AMT are similar to distributions for the 
United States as a whole, with the exception that education levels are higher and respondents are more 
democratic (liberal) than the US population average. Similarly, previous studies have shown that the quality 
of survey data obtained from participants recruited via AMT is as good as the quality of data obtained via 
other sampling approaches1 (Barabas and Jerit 2010; Ipeirotis 2010; Paolacci et al. 2010).  When examining 
our sample more closely we find that when comparing treatment and control groups, the mean values of the 
socio-demographic variables are very similar (Figure 1 in the online appendix). We can thus safely move to 
the analysis of treatment effects (Mutz 2011, p. 83). 
 The initial survey was administered to 2000 participants from the US on 25 November 2014 (the 
survey was open for 48 hours). Randomly selected participants were then exposed to two treatments within 
around two days (followed by the final survey on 15 December 2014; the final survey was open for 72 
hours). We excluded from the analysis participants whom we were unable to expose to both treatments. The 
first treatment took place on 3 December (the treatment survey was open for 36 hours), whilst the second 
treatment survey took place on 5 December (the treatment survey was open for 36 hours). 398 participants 
received two treatments with positive cues about the COP. A total of 395 participants received two 
treatments with negative cues about the COP. To simplify the analysis, we did not use mixed positive and 
negative treatments. Due to initial participants’ lack of exposure to both treatment rounds or non-
participation in the final survey, we ended up with a sample that includes 793 participants in the treatment 
groups and 399 participants in the control group (N=1192). Besides dropouts (common in panel surveys), 
the sample also shrank after elimination of respondents who clicked through the (online) survey at very high 
speed (making it very unlikely that they answered carefully). For instance, the initial and final surveys 
suggested that participants needed around 12 minutes to carefully complete the questionnaire. Given that the 
average answering time in our sample was 8 minutes, we kept those participants who completed the surveys 
within 6 to 20 minutes2. In addition, we dropped observations with ‘don’t know’ responses. 
 To prevent participants in the treatment groups from simply clicking through the survey experiment 
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without reading the treatment texts, we included comprehension check questions about facts included in 
the treatment information. We excluded participants who provided wrong answers to these control questions 
from our sample. Additionally, we used several attentiveness checks. For instance, we asked a question 
twice to test whether respondents gave the same response to the same question. Approximately 250 
participants were dropped from our sample because they failed the aforementioned control checks. 
However, when we include all participants in our analysis the results we present below remain largely 
unchanged (see online Appendix, Table 2). 
 
Climate Change Awareness and Policy Preferences (Dependent Variables) 
The two outcome variables in the analysis, Awareness and Policy Preferences, were constructed based on 
batteries of survey items (Table 1). We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to statistically evaluate 
whether the survey data fit our measurement model, i.e., whether the selected survey questions indeed reveal 
the latent constructs of awareness (4 items) and policy preferences (4 items). Table 2 illustrates the results of 
the CFA along with the eigenvalue for each factor variable. As can be seen in Table 2, most of the factor 
loading for the awareness t (initial survey) and awareness t+1 (final survey) variables remain in the 0.4-0.7 
range. For Policy Preferences t (initial survey) and Policy Preferences t+1 (final survey), the factor loading 
range is between 0.4 and 0.6. 
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Table 1: Survey items used to construct the dependent variables 
Awareness  
Questions Answers 
1. How much had you thought about global 
warming before today? 
1  A lot 
2  Some 
3  A little 
4  Not at all 
2. Do you think you would be able to describe in 
very simple terms to another person what the 
problem of global warming is? 
1  Yes 
2  To some extent 
3  No 
3. How often do you watch, listen to, or read news 
media reporting on global warming or discuss the 
issue with colleagues, friends, or family? 
1  Never 
2  Rarely 
3  Sometimes 
4  Often 
5  Very often 
 
4. Would you be able to explain, in simple terms, 
to another person what the annual Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate 
Change is? 
 
1  No 
2  To some extent 
3  Yes 
 
Policy Preferences  
People hold different views about whether policy-
makers should give priority to measures against 
global warming, even if such measures are costly 
and have a negative effect on the economy. What 
is your view? 
 
1  Should give priority to measures against 
global warming 
2  Should not give priority to measures 
against global warming 
3  Don’t know 
Do you favor or oppose expanding forests, even if 
this means less land for agriculture or 
construction? 
 
1  Favour strongly 
2  Favour somewhat 
3  Oppose somewhat 
4  Oppose strongly 
5  Don’t know 
 
Do you favor or oppose increasing the 
requirements for fuel efficiency (this means more 
miles per gallon of fuel) of automobiles, even if 
this raises the cost of cars as well as bus and 
airfares? 
 
1  Favour strongly 
2  Favour somewhat 
3  Oppose somewhat 
4  Oppose strongly 
5  Don’t know 
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Imagine that taking effective steps against global 
warming would increase energy costs to the 
average household in the United States by 30 
dollars per month. Would you be willing or not be 
willing to pay this additional cost as part of taking 
steps against global warming? 
1  Would be willing 
2  Would not be willing 
3  Don’t know 
 
 
Table 2: Results of confirmatory factor analysis 
 Awareness  
t 
Awareness  
t+1 
Policy 
Preferences 
t 
Policy 
Preferences 
t+1 
Heard about global warming  0.63 0.67   
Describe global warming 0.48 0.52   
Watch, listen, discuss global 
warming  
0.65 0.67   
Explain the COP  0.41 0.42   
Tax increase for policies   0.45 0.44 
Policy makers should give 
priority 
  0.48 0.52 
Favor or oppose expanding 
forests 
  0.47 0.58 
Favor or oppose increasing the 
requirements for fuel efficiency 
of automobiles 
  0.58 0.46 
N 1192 1192 1192 1192 
Eigenvalue 1.24 1.36 1.02 1.21 
Note: only a single factor resulted in an eigenvalue greater than 1 in all four latent 
constructs. The eigenvalue for the significant factor is reported in the last row. 
 
The data analysis below focuses on how much the composite variables Awareness and Policy Preferences 
(both of which are continuous variables) change from the first to the final survey, i.e.: 
Awareness = Awareness t+1 - Awareness t 
Policy Preferences = Policy preferences t+1 - Policy preferences t 
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We first examine whether exposure to any treatment has an effect on Awareness and Policy Preferences, 
and then look separately at whether treatments with positive or negative information on the COP matter 
more. We employ dummy variables that measure the exposure to information. 
 
Treatment Conditions (Independent Variables) 
Participants randomly selected into the treatment conditions and received two treatments within 
approximately two days. Each treated participant received two treatments with positive information about 
the climate COP, or two treatments with negative information about the COP. To make the analysis simpler 
and clearer, we did not use mixed information. The treatment texts are shown in Table 3. We acknowledge 
that people usually select their news sources respecting their own general interests. An experimental design 
of self-selection of news outlets, though, does not allow examination of treatment effects (as treatments will 
not be the same)3. The treatments’ wording is heavily based on news media reporting on the 2014 COP in 
Lima (notably in the New York Times, The Guardian, and Fox News). To avoid ‘messenger’ and other 
types of effects on participants that are not of interest in this paper (e.g., length and format of a report), we 
made the treatments similar in structure and wording (except of course the positive or negative perspectives 
on the COP), and kept the treatment texts short and clear. That is, we use stylized treatment wordings, rather 
than copies of text from specific media outlets or entire media reports. Each treatment was followed by a 
very brief survey, with two questions about the treatment text. This brief add-on survey was meant to ensure 
that the participant received and read the treatment text, and that we know that they were treated. 
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Table 3: Treatments 
Treatment              Description 
 1st wave of treatments 
1. Positive 
information 
on COP 
As you may have heard or read, governments from around the 
world are currently meeting in Lima, the capital of Peru, to 
negotiate an agreement against global warming, also known as 
climate change. Most journalist and academics who have 
observed such negotiations for a long time agree that an 
agreement against global warming is very difficult to achieve. 
The reason is that almost 200 countries are involved in these 
negotiations, and these countries have different national interests. 
Experts also agree, however, that the global warming issue is 
relevant to all countries worldwide. For that reason, they think 
that involving all countries in these negotiations is the right thing 
to do. Moreover, despite this complicated negotiation process and 
different national interests, they think that the results achieved so 
far are useful and are contributing towards solving the global 
warming problem. 
2. Negative 
information 
on COP 
As you may have heard or read, governments from around the 
world are currently meeting in Lima, the capital of Peru, to 
negotiate an agreement against global warming, also known as 
climate change. Most journalist and academics who have 
observed such negotiations for a long time agree that an 
agreement against global warming is very difficult to achieve. 
The reason is that almost 200 countries are involved in these 
negotiations, and these countries have different national interests. 
Experts also agree that, because of this complicated negotiation 
process and different national interests, the results achieved so far 
are not useful and are not contributing towards solving the global 
warming problem. 
 
 2nd wave of treatments 
1. Positive 
information 
on COP 
According to news reports, negotiations on an agreement against 
global warming, also known as climate change, which are 
currently taking place in Lima, Peru, have made considerable 
progress. Most of the 200 countries participating in the 
negotiations agree that an agreement against global warming will 
be reached by the end of 2015. In addition, most industrialized 
countries, including the United States and European countries, 
have agreed to provide substantial amounts of funding to help 
poorer countries reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, which 
cause global warming, and to help them protect against negative 
effects of global warming (e.g. storms, floods, droughts). Thus, it 
seems that world leaders are going to reach an agreement against 
global warming. Many experts are therefore quite optimistic 
about the results of negotiations currently held in Lima, Peru. 
2. Negative 
information 
on COP 
According to news reports, negotiations on an agreement against 
global warming, also known as climate change, which are 
currently taking place in Lima, Peru, have made almost no 
progress. The 200 countries participating in the negotiations 
	16	
 
  
disagree over whether an agreement against global warming can 
be reached by the end of 2015. In addition, most industrialized 
countries, including the United States and European countries, 
have only agreed to provide very small amounts of funding to 
help poorer countries reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, 
which cause global warming, and to help them protect against 
negative effects of global warming (e.g. storms, floods, 
droughts). Thus, it seems that world leaders are not going to 
reach an agreement against global warming. Many experts are 
therefore quite pessimistic about the results of negotiations 
currently held in Lima, Peru. 
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 Since our (stylized) treatments were administered during the climate COP in Lima, it is obviously 
possible that participants both in the treatment and control groups were exposed to other, additional 
information about the COP (e.g., when watching television between our first and last survey). We 
deliberately chose this timing, however, in order to expose our hypotheses to a hard test. Implementing the 
survey experiment around the time of the climate COP increases the possibility of additional exposure of 
participants to ‘real world’ information about the COP –because media reporting is usually more intense 
during climate COPs than before or after. This setting should make it harder to identify statistically 
significant treatment effects. It is also realistic, in the sense that we do not treat people with news about a 
COP that, in reality, does not take place – and where this might confuse or evoke negative reactions by 
respondents who are more aware of climate change issues.  From a purely methodological standpoint, our 
choice of timing is fine as long as our random assignment to treatment and control conditions is effective. 
This is because effective randomization homogenizes the probability of exposure to additional (non-
experimental) information across treatment and control groups. For instance, participating in the initial 
survey may motivate some respondents more than others to read more about the COP in the media during 
the event. Yet, subsequent random assignment of participants to treatment and control groups ensures that 
individuals who were more (or less) motivated and acquired more or less additional information outside the 
experiment do not cluster in one of our experimental groups.4 
 
 
Control variables 
Although participants are randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions, we still employ some 
control variables to increase the precision of the estimate but, by design, they should have no effect on the 
coefficient on the treatment variables (Imai et al. 2011). We thus take into consideration that participants are 
likely to differ in their knowledge of climate change issues. Our empirical models control for climate 
change-related knowledge at time t (initial survey) and changes in knowledge from the first to the last 
survey. The number of correct answers measures the knowledge of each individual about climate change 
issues.5  Other research has shown that climate change awareness and policy preferences are influenced by 
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socio-demographic factors (Blake 2001; Kollmus and Agyeman 2002). We thus include two demographic 
variables, gender and age. Gender is a dummy variable, 1 for male and 2 for female. Age is a categorical 
variable that assigns each individual to an age band (18-30, 31-50, and 51 or older). We also consider 
income, education, and political ideology. Income captures the annual income of a participant and is 
measured by the following categories: up to $50,000, $50,000-$150,000, and more than $150,000. 
Education captures the highest level of education of a participant. The categories are: Low (Some High 
School, no degree, High School, Some College, no degree), medium (Associate degree, Bachelor), and high 
(Graduate: Master, PhD., Professional Degree/MD). Ideology is a categorical variable that measures 
individuals’ political position on a scale of 1 to 7, from Independent to strong Republican. 
 
Results 
Figure 2 shows to what degree the positive or negative information combined, or with positive or negative 
information separately, have changed participants’ levels of climate-change awareness.6 It shows that the 
mean value of Awareness in the control group (where participants did not receive any treatment concerning 
the climate COP) is 3.1 percentage points smaller than the mean value in the treated group. The mean value 
of Awareness in the group that did not receive positive information about the COP is 1.1 percentage points 
smaller than the mean value of those treated with positive information. The mean value of Awareness in the 
group that did not receive negative information is 1.9 percentage points smaller than the mean value of those 
treated with negative reporting. The difference between the positive and the negative treatment is 
observable, as expected, but not statistically significant.  
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Figure 2: Treatment effects, changes in Awareness 
 
 
Note: percentage points denote mean differences between treatment (aggregate, positive and negative) 
and control groups. Where whiskers cross the 0-dashed line the estimated treatment effect is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. All response items are scaled from 0 to 1, so that differences in 
means can be read as percentage-point change of Awareness. For example, the mean Awareness score 
of individuals treated with negative news about the COP is 1.9 percentage points higher in comparison 
to the mean of respondents treated with positive news. 
 
Similarly, we calculated the differences in the means for changes in policy preferences. Figure 3 shows that 
the treatment effect for all groups crosses the 0-dashed line. This means that treatment effects are not 
statistically significant. Thus, from a statistical viewpoint, our treatments do not have an impact on Policy 
Preferences. 
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Figure 3: Treatment effects, changes in Policy Preferences 
 
Note: percentage points denote mean differences between treatment (aggregate, positive and 
negative) and control groups. Where whiskers cross the 0-dashed line the estimated treatment effect 
is not statistically significant at the 5% level. All response items are scaled from 0 to 1, so that 
differences in means can be read as percentage-point changes of Policy Preferences.  
 
 Table 4 shows the results of all statistical models. Models 1 and 2 indicate the effects of positive and 
negative information about the COP on changes in Awareness and changes in Policy Preferences.7 
Treatments with any information on the COP (positive or negative) result in a 0.03 points increase in 
Awareness. An effect of the same magnitude is observed for treatments with either positive or negative 
information. This finding supports Hypothesis 1a, which holds that the COP and associated mass media 
reporting have a positive effect on citizens’ awareness of climate change. To some degree we also find 
support for Hypothesis 1b; although negative and positive media reporting has an effect in the expected 
direction, the two treatment effects are not significantly different from each other. This means that 
individuals’ awareness of climate change shifts positively, irrespective of the tone of the information 
received. This finding resonates with existing research focused on the media’s effects on public opinion. 
This research suggests that the level of public awareness concerning environmental issues tends to be 
Treatment (aggregate)
Positive treatment
Negative treatment
-.04 -.02 0 .02
Difference in means
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affected by media attention as such, rather than by the substantive content of media reports (Mazur and 
Lee 1993; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). 
 Regarding climate Policy Preferences, Model 3 shows that exposure to positive or negative media 
information on the COP has no significant effect on Policy Preferences. This result also upholds in Model 4 
(Table 4), which examines positive and negative reporting in disaggregated form. These results are thus 
consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
 Although people receive information about the COP that indeed increases their awareness of climate 
change (Model 1 and 2 in Table 4), the legitimacy and the importance of these negotiations do not overcome 
a condition Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) refer to as ‘balance as bias’. In this context, the COP concerns a 
scientific issue—climate change—however, the news present it as a debate between politicians and 
policymakers and this makes people neglect the importance of the issue, and therefore, the necessity of 
mitigation policies. In addition, the element of trust often determines people’s decisions and preferences 
(Corbett and Durfee 2004; Hmielowski et al. 2014) and often media do not appear as a reliable source. 
Grundaman (2007) shows that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is highly visible both 
in the US and German news. The difference though lies on the fact that sceptics are more visible on the US 
media than the German media.  In a later study Gauchat (2012) notes that the United States media neglect to 
present highly scientific evidence regarding climate change that decreases the salience of climate change 
and / or that challenges the scientific community. This in turn distracts people from the climate change 
reality (i.e., providing scientific evidence) mostly because they focus on ideological debates about climate 
change (Gauchat 2012). 
 With respect to the control variables, prior knowledge and changes in knowledge of climate change 
issues do not have a significant effect on changes in Awareness and Policy Preferences. Socio-demographic 
variables behave according to our expectations, with little statistical significance in the models. As with 
other studies, we find significant differences between Democrats and Republicans (Nisbet et al. 2015). 
Notably, we find that conservatives are more affected by our treatments than participants with liberal views.8  
The main reason is likely to be that liberal participants enter the experiment with already higher levels of 
climate change awareness, reducing the marginal effect of our treatments. 
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Table 4: OLS regression models 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
 Awareness (Δ) Awareness (Δ) Policy Preferences (Δ) 
Policy Preferences 
(Δ) 
Treatment 0.03***  0.01  
 (0.00)  (0.02)  
Positive  0.03***  0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Negative  0.03***  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Knowledge (t) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.0) (0.02) (0.02) 
Knowledge (Δ) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.0) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ideology 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.06** -0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.75*** -0.75 
         (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 1192 1192 1192 1192 
F-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. We also 
estimated weighted regressions for Models 1 and 3 in order to obtain a sample more 
representative of the underlying population. The statistical results virtually remain the 
same as those presented in Table 4. 
 
 Existing studies show that people with higher levels of climate problem awareness tend to be more 
willing to support climate risk mitigation measures (Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Weber 2010). Therefore, they 
might also react differently to exposure to information about climate COPs. Figures 4 and 5 examine 
whether and how initial awareness of the climate change problem and initial policy preferences, 
respectively, condition the treatment effect of interest.9 First, with regards to the left panel (Figure 4(a)), 
there is a significant difference between the treatment and control group until the value of about 0.6 in 
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Awareness at time t (Initial Awareness). Beyond a value of 0.6 in Awareness, however, the treated and 
control groups converge and, in fact, overlap; that is, there is no difference between the two groups 
anymore. Moreover, Change in Awareness decreases with the level of initial awareness. Hence, respondents 
who do not have any initial awareness (Initial Awareness=0) and have received the treatment, experience an 
increase in Awareness of about 0.58 points. Conversely, a treated participant with an initial awareness level 
of 1 only experiences an increase of about 0.25. These two different levels of Awareness increases (0.58 vs. 
0.25) are statistically different from each other.  
 Similarly, comparing participants within the positive and negative treatment groups, we observe 
greater positive changes in awareness for those participants with lower starting values (Figure 5(a)). 
Accordingly, participants with no initial Awareness (Initial Awareness=0) who received the positive 
treatment experienced an increase of about 0.59 points. Although in the earlier analysis, positive and 
negative treatments were not significantly different from each other, there is a difference when examining 
different levels of initial awareness. 
 Concerning policy preferences, there is no significant difference between the treatment and the 
control groups: the two graphs in the right side panels of both Figure 4(b) and Figure 5(b) overlap for each 
value of the initial policy preference. In other words, media reporting does not affect preferences concerning 
climate-change policies conditional on initial preferences. Overall, respondents with initially weaker 
preferences for climate policy increase their support of mitigation policies more strongly than individuals 
with more positive initial policy preferences. This finding applies to both the treatment and control groups. 
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Figure 4: Moderating effect of Initial Awareness and Initial Policy Preferences 
(treatment aggregate; positive or negative) 
Figure 4(a)           Figure 4(b) 
	
Note:  solid lines indicate marginal effects; dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5: Moderating effect of Initial Awareness and Initial Policy Preferences 
 (positive and negative treatments) 
Figure 5(a)                                  Figure 5(b) 
	
Note:  solid lines indicate marginal effects; dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. 
 
Conclusion 
Our study is based on the presumption that public opinion is important in climate policymaking. This is 
because effective climate policy requires fundamental changes in individual citizens’ behaviour, and 
democratic policymakers are largely concerned with what citizens want. As such, we are interested in 
whether the quasi-annual ‘bombardment’ of citizens with news about the climate COP has an impact, and 
whether it works in favour of or against attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To overcome 
endogeneity and causal inference problems in studying this question we use an experimental approach. 
 We find that exposure to news about the COP, and by implication the COP itself, increases 
awareness of climate change, particularly among participants whose initial awareness is low. However, it 
has no significant effect on citizens’ climate policy preferences. Our sample shows somewhat different rates 
in some of the sociological drivers by comparison with the US population average (i.e., education, ideology, 
income), and this is why we primarily focus on treatments’ effects, avoiding generalizability. Furthermore, 
research comparing treatment effects between nationally representative and convenience samples finds that 
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both show similar results (Mullinix et al. 2015).  Overall, our finding resonates with Bernard Cohen’s 
dictum that ‘the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’ (Cohen 1963: 13). 
 This is the first survey we know of that uses an experimental approach and a pre- / post- COP design 
to study whether climate COPs leave an imprint on citizens. Of course, we cannot randomly assign people to 
settings where they are exposed to the mass media, and settings where they are completely cut off from mass 
media, which implies that our experiment cannot exclude the possibility that many participants in the control 
group are also treated, and that participants in the control and treatment groups self-select into additional 
‘real world’ information treatments. We believe that our approach—random assignment to treatment or 
control conditions—effectively deals with these challenges. However, further research could explore 
whether treatment effects change in size and direction outside the COP period, when subjects are less 
exposed to climate change information outside the experiment. Moreover, one could consider different 
treatment condition designs, such as exposure to multiple treatments, including treatments with ambiguous 
(rather than positive or negative) information about the COP.   
 Finally, some recent work on the media - public opinion nexus suggests that relatively simple 
information treatment designs such as the ones used in our experiments should be complemented by media 
exposure experiments that let participants self-select into particular types and forms of information about the 
phenomenon of interest (in our case climate change). Arceneaux and Johnson (2010), for instance, argue 
that media effects may weaken or even disappear once participants can self-select media exposure. One of 
our main findings, that media exposure does not change climate policy preferences, is unlikely to differ if 
self-selection of media consumption was made a part of our experimental design. However, future work 
could assess whether the ‘COP effect’ on awareness still holds up when participants self-select into media 
exposure. At the same time, further research should also investigate any potential difference between 
content effects and news outlet effects. This would shed further light on the importance of self-selection of 
news outlets. 
 In an era where global governance efforts are increasingly characterized by political ‘mega-events’, 
it is worthwhile to ask whether such events not only influence policymakers’ and general elite awareness 
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and preferences, but also problem awareness and policy preferences among the general public. 
Understanding such impacts seems particularly valuable in policy areas where solutions to global 
challenges, for instance gender equality, human rights, or environmental protection, cannot be achieved by 
simple top-down policies instituted by government representatives, but require widespread involvement and 
support of the general public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes
																																																								
1 Table 1 in the online appendix offers a comparison between US census socio-demographics and the 
corresponding distributions in our sample. 
2 We set the limit at 20 minutes because AMT participants usually (as in our study) leave feedback and 
comments at the end of a survey before they log out of the system and survey time formally ends.  
3 Studies employing self-selection of news or news outlets still provide participants with a few options. This 
is ultimately a “controlled” selection of options (see also Arceneaux and Johnson (2010)) 
4 For more on media exposure refer to Figures 2 & 3 in the online appendix. 
5 Refer to the online appendix, Table 3, for survey questions. 
6 The purpose of calculating the difference in means is to compare the treatment groups to the control group. 
Note that the treatment in aggregate level appears larger in comparison to the individual treatment groups of 
positive (N=398) and negative (N=395) news because this group refers to all the participants that have been 
treated with either positive or negative news (N= 793). 
7 See online appendix for an illustration of first differences estimations for changes in Awareness and Policy 
Preferences (Figures 4 & 5). 
8 See online appendix: Figures 6 & 7. 
9 Refer to the online appendix in Table 4 for the models’ specifications. 
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Appendix: 
Figure 1: Sample balance 
 
Note: the figure compares socio-demographic variables across the control and two treatment 
groups. For example, for age, the results indicate that the control, positive and negative groups’ 
mean converge at around 1.3. 
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Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of our sample (USA) 
 Our sample  Population Source of 
population data 
Ideology Liberal: 52% Liberal: 34% ANES 2008-2009 
Panel study 
 Conservative: 18% Conservative: 45%  
Education Some High School, no degree: 
0.42% 
Less than 9th grade: 5% U.S. Census 
Bureau, Current 
 Some college, no degree: 26% 9th to 12th grade, no diploma: 
8% 
Population Survey, 
November 2008 
 High school: 9% High school graduate: 31%  
 Associate degree: 11% Some college or associate's 
degree: 28% 
 
 Bachelor: 41% Bachelor's degree: 18%  
 Graduate (Master, PhD, 
Professional degree/MD): 12% 
Advanced degree: 9%  
Income The median category in our 
sample is: $120,000 - $149,999  
The 2013 U.S. median house- 
hold income was $52,250 
U.S. Census 
Bureau: total 
median 
income for 
household 
Retrieved April 
2015 
Gender 1.17 m/f ratio 15-64 years: 1 m/f 
65-: 0.77 m/f 
Total population: 0.97 m/f 
(2011 est.) 
The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
Age The median category in our 
sample is 30 years old and below 
Median age (or total pop) 
Total: 37.1 years 
The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
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Table 2: OLS regression models (total sample) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
 Awareness (Δ) Awareness (Δ) Policy Preferences (Δ) 
Policy Preferences 
(Δ) 
Treatment 0.03***  -0.00  
 (0.00)  (0.02)  
Positive  0.03***  -0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Negative  0.04***  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Knowledge (t) -0.01* -0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.0) (0.02) (0.02) 
Knowledge (Δ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.0) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ideology 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.76*** -0.76 
         (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
N 1463 1463 1463 1463 
F-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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To obtain additional information we asked participants in the last survey whether they searched for 
additional information on global warming and policies against global warming in the meantime, and if so 
what motivated them. Descriptive statistics indicate that most of our participants did not search for 
additional information, but that, as one would expect, respondents in the treatment conditions were 
somewhat more likely to do so. 
 
Figure 2: Motivations of participants to search for additional information 
 
Note: Frequency indicates the number of participants in each group. Positive group: N=398. 
Negative group: N=395. Control group N=399. Participants were asked in the last survey about 
whether and if so why they were looking for additional information on global warming and 
policies against global warming. The results suggest that respondents in the treatment groups 
(positive & negative) were motivated more by our previous survey than other motivations. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the means: exposure to media about global warming 
 
 
Note: the figure compares the means of the control and two treatment groups for the exposure to 
media about global warming. The results indicate that the control, positive and negative groups’ 
means are different either we ask before (red points) or after the COP (blue points). For example the 
control group’s exposure to media about global warming before the COP is around 2.84, the positive 
group is about 2.86 and the negative group is at 2.83. 
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Table 3: Survey questions for control variables 
Questions Answers 
Socio-demographics  
What is the highest level of education you 
have completed?  
 
1  Some High School, no degree 
2  High School 
3  Some College, no degree 
4  Associate degree 
5  Bachelor 
6  Graduate (Master, PhD., 
Professional degree/MD) 
7  Other 
In what year were you born? 
 
 
 
Thinking back over the last year, what 
was your family's annual income?  
 
1  Less than $10,000  
2  $10,000 - $19,999  
3  $20,000 - $29,999  
4  $30,000 - $39,999  
5  $40,000 - $49,999  
6  $50,000 - $59,999  
7  $60,000 - $69,999  
8  $70,000 - $79,999  
9  $80,000 - $99,999  
10  $100,000 - $119,999  
11  $120,000 - $149,999  
12  $150,000 - $199,999  
13  $200,000 - $249,999  
14  $250,000 - $349,999  
15  $350,000 - $499,999  
16  $500,000 or more  
17  Prefer not to say  
Thinking about politics these days, how 
would you describe your own political 
viewpoint? 
 
1  Very liberal 
2  Liberal 
3  Moderate 
4  Conservative 
5  Very conservative 
What is your gender 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
Knowledge about climate change  
When you think of carbon dioxide 
emissions worldwide, what percentage of 
those worldwide emissions takes place 
within the United States?  
0% to 100% (continuous scale) 
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In your opinion what is the main goal of 
policies against global warming that most 
countries tend to agree with. The goal is 
to keep the global temperature increase 
within/below 
1  1 degree Celsius 
2  2 degrees Celsius 
3  3 degrees Celsius 
4  4 degrees Celsius 
5  5 degrees Celsius 
6  6 degrees Celsius 
7  7 degrees Celsius 
8  8 degrees Celsius 
9  9 degrees Celsius 
10  10 degrees Celsius 
11  Do not know 
 
The “greenhouse effect”, as debated in 
international negotiations on global 
warming, refers to: 
1  Gases in the atmosphere that trap 
heat 
2  The Earth’s protective ozone layer 
3  Pollution that causes acid rain 
4  How plants grow 
5  Do not know 
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Figures 4 and 5 show first differences estimations for changes in Awareness and Policy Preferences 
respectively. Both figures depict first differences and their 95% confidence intervals resulting from changes in 
values on the main explanatory variables. The other variables are held constant at their respective medians 
(King et al., 2000). For instance, changing the extent of news reporting about the COP from 0 (no treatment) 
to 1 (treatment), results in an increase of 0.03 points in Awareness (Figure 4). Yet, media reporting does not 
have a significant effect on Policy Preferences (Figure 5). These results are consistent with our previous 
findings concerning treatment effects (Table 4 in main analysis). The results for the control variables are 
also similar to those in shown in Models 1 and 3 (Table 4 in main analysis). 
 
Figure 4: First difference estimates: changes in Awareness (treatment aggregate; positive or negative) 
 
Note: the First Difference indicates the unit change in the dependent variable when changing the 
respective explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum (binary variables: 0 to 1), while 
holding all other variables at their median values. Effects where whiskers cross the 0-line are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Figure 5: First differences estimates: changes in Policy Preferences (treatment aggregate; positive or 
negative) 
 
Note: the First Difference indicates the unit change in the dependent variable when changing the 
respective explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum (binary variables: 0 to 1), while 
holding all other variables at their median values. Effects where whiskers cross the 0-line are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: OLS regression models (Model specifications for Figures 4 & 5 in the main analysis) 
 (Model 1 Figure 4(a)) 
(Model 2, Figure 4 
(b)) 
(Model 3 Figure 
5(a)) 
(Model 4 Figure 
5(b)) 
 Awareness (Δ) Policy Preferences (Δ) Awareness (Δ) 
Policy Preferences 
(Δ) 
Treatment  0.07***  0.03**   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
Type of news 
(positive and 
negative) 
   -0.01                               (0.02) 
-0.02                      
(0.01) 
Awareness (t)       -0.25***           -0.33***  
          (0.03)            (0.02)  
Policy preferences 
(t)          
  -0.83***                      
(0.02)  
0.87***                      
(0.02) 
     
Knowledge (t) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.0) (0.00) (0.00) 
Knowledge (Δ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Income   0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.0) (0.00) (0.01) 
Ideology 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age    0.02** -0.00 0.02** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Initial 
Awareness*treatm
ent (aggregate) 
 
-0.08**                      
(0.04)    
Initial Policy 
Preferences*treat
ment (aggregate) 
 
 -0.74***                      (0.02) 
   
  
Initial Awareness 
*type of news 
(positive & 
negative) 
 
     
  
0.02                      
(0.04)  
Initial Policy 
Preferences*type 
of news (positive 
& negative) 
 
       -0.74***                      (0.02) 
Constant  0.47***     -0.836***     0.556*** 0.87*** 
         (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
N 1192 1192 793 793 
F-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models 3 and 4 refer to within the 
treatment group examination. In this case the participants have been treated with either positive or negative 
news.  
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Figure 6 demonstrates that our treatment affects differently citizens along their ideological views. The 
results indicate that individuals in our sample with liberal views do not seem to be affected by the treatment. 
It is common that liberals are more aware about climate change issues in comparison to conservatives. 
Therefore, we see that people that are conservative and received the treatment have largely increased their 
awareness about climate change. However, there is not difference for liberals and conservatives regarding 
the Policy Preferences about climate change (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6: Moderating effect of ideology and changes in Awareness 
(treatment aggregate; positive or negative) 
 
 
Note:  solid lines indicate marginal effects; dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 7: Moderating effect of ideology and changes in Policy Preferences 
(treatment aggregate; positive or negative) 
 
Note:  solid lines indicate marginal effects; dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.  
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